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JJarifyn M. branch 
®erk of the Court 
Clerk of Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Francia v. Health & Tennis Corporation of America 
Case No. 960279-CA 
Dear Clerk: 
This letter serves as a citation of supplemental authorities 
pursuant to Rule 24 (i) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On 
June 14, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court decided the matter of 
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 2 92 Utah Adv. Rpts. 27, 29, 
(Utah 1996), a copy attached hereto. In that case, page 29, 
lower right hand column, the court stated, "all parties to a 
contract may generally exempt themselves from negligence 
liability, the language they may use must 'clearly and 
equivocally' express an intent to limit tort liability in a 
contract itself." It appears to us that this language is 
pertinent to the argument contained in our brief at pages 10-12. 
Thank you for your assistance in drawing this supplemental 
citation to the attention to the members of the court. 
Sincerely, 
Robe 
RHW/ar 
Encl: Interwest Construction v. 
292 Utah Adv. Rpts. 27, 
Palmer, 
29, (Utah 1996) 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
R. Roy PALMER and Val W. Palmer, dha 
A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba 
A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures 
Company and Fiberglass Structures 
Company, Inc., 
T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s a n d 
Respondents. 
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, 
fka Fiberglass Structures Company of St. 
Paul, Inc., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Thiokol Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 940616 
FILED: June 14, 1996 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable Gordon R. Low 
ATTORNEYS: 
Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt 
Lake City, for Interwest Construction 
George W. Preston, Logan, and Robert T. 
Wallace, Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & 
Sons 
John E. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard 
and Fiberglass Structures 
Anthony B. Qutnn, Mary Anne Q. Wood, 
Richard G. Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for 
Thiokol 
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus 
Utah Manufacturers Association 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Following the trial court's entry of judgment 
on a contract dispute m favor of Interwest 
Construction ("Interwest") and A.H. Palmer and 
Sons ("Palmer"), Thiokol Corporation 
l^Thiokop appealed to this court, and we 
poured the appeal to the court of appeals. We 
then granted certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the trial court 
judgment. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 
P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub 
nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995). Our present review is limited to 
considering whether the court of appeals erred m 
holding (I) that our decision m Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict 
liability arising out of the breach of contractually 
defined obligations; and (n) that Thiokol waived 
its rights to enforce its contract with Interwest. 
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's 
findings of fact The trial court initially detailed 
its findings by memorandum decision and then 
by formal findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings. Stale 
v. A House <k 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535 
(Utah 1994).1 
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest 
entered mto a contract under which Interwest 
agreed to build a wastewater treatment facility 
for Thiokol. Interwest subsequently 
subcontracted with Palmer for labor and 
materials m connection with the construction of 
the facdity. Palmer, m turn, subcontracted with 
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc. 
("Fiberglass Structures"), for the purchase of 
three fiberglass wastewater storage tanks for the 
facility. Palmer's purchase order required 
Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans 
and specifications unless it obtained prior 
approval to deviate from them. 
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the 
treatment facility designated the fiberglass tanks 
as T32, T33, and T34 and called for the tanks to 
be budt m accordance with "applicable 
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national 
voluntary industry standard governing the 
construction of fiberglass tanks. The tanks were 
designed to collect wastewater from four smaller 
tanks located mside the treatment budding by 
means of a gravity-feed system. Because the 
tanks mside the building were smaller than the 
three external tanks, the gravity-feed system 
allowed the external tanks to become only 
two-thirds full at maximum. Thiokol approved 
specifications for the tanks indicating that their 
walls would be 1/4 inch thick. 
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated 
fiberglass panels to the treatment facility site. 
The panels were bolted together along vertical 
seams to create each of the three tanks, and the 
tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the 
treatment building. The top of each tank was 
bolted to the sides, and fill pipes were connected 
between the three external and the four internal 
tanks. The three external tanks were completed 
and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial 
test that same day, tank T34 burst along one of 
the vertical seams connecting two of its 
fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2, 
1989. Thiokol inspected the treatment facility 
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and notified Interwest that the facility was 
substantially complete with the exception of a 
few punch-list items, which did not include the 
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other 
two tanks. The same day, Palmer gave Thiokol 
a one-year warranty on all then-installed work. 
Thiokol hired an independent consulting 
engineer to review the cause of tank T34's 
failure, and the consultant recommended that 
Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant 
was concerned about the strength of the tanks' 
vertical panels, among other things, and 
recommended increasing the thickness of the 
panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design, 
to 3/4 inch. However, Thiokol's project 
engineer directed the consultant to focus on 
fixing the tanks' seams Thereafter, Thiokol 
negotiated separately and directly with 
Fiberglass Structures tor the repair of tanks T32 
andT33 and replacement of tank T34, Thiokol's 
involvement was such that the trial court 
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures 
"jointly constructed the tanks." Specifications 
for the modified tanks clearly indicated that they 
would have 1/4-inch thick walls and a safety 
factor of 6 
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and 
accepted the repaired tanks on the basis of its 
determination that the tanks met its 
specifications On June 13th, Fiberglass 
Structures gave Thiokol an extended three-year 
warranty at Thiokol's insistence, which 
warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but 
expressly excluded damage resulting from 
modifications to the tanks. Interwest and Palmer 
were minimally, if at all, involved in these 
negotiations 
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the 
treatment facility Sometime that month, without 
the knowledge of Interwest, Palmer, or 
Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the 
tanks' filling system from the original 
gravity-feed design to an overhead, 
high-pressure pump feed. 
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured, 
spilling its wastewater contents. The trial court 
found that the pump feed system allowed the 
tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed 
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol 
employee Given the pumping capacity, there 
was an insufficient opening at the top of the tank 
to allow for the escape of excess wastewater, 
thus causing an uplift pressure which the tank 
was not designed to withstand. The overfilling 
and consequent uplift pressure caused the tank to 
lift up from its concrete base and to split from 
the bottom up along the middle of one of the 
fiberglass panels, not along a seam as was the 
case with tank T34's earlier failure. 
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol 
withheld $200,000 which it owed to Interwest 
on the original contract. That amount included 
$93,653 70 which Interwest owed to Palmer. 
The instant action began when Interwest sued 
Palmer for breach of warranty, negligence, 
indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer then 
filed a third-party complaint agamst Fiberglass 
Structures, which in turn filed a third-party 
complaint agamst Thiokol. Interwest later added 
Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery for 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment 
Thiokol eventually counterclaimed agamst 
Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass Structures for 
breach of contract, breach of express and 
implied warranties, negligence, and strict 
liability 
After a two-week bench trial, the trial court 
concluded in relevant part that (i) it would not 
address Thiokol's tort claims because the case 
was "entirely controlled by contract", (n) the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated 
into the contract so as to specify a particular 
wall thickness or safety factor for the fiberglass 
panels and, therefore, Thiokol could not hold its 
suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with 
a specific wall thickness and safety factor, (m) 
neither Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass 
Structures failed to comply with the contract in 
any way which caused or resulted in the August 
24th failure of tank T33, (IV) Thiokol failed to 
prove the cause of tank T33's failure and the 
most likely cause was Thiokol's overfilling the 
tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the tanks 
barred its recovery under any of its suppliers' 
warranties Accordingly, the trial court ordered 
Thiokol to pay Interwest $200,000, ordered 
Interwest to pay Palmer $Q3,653 70, and 
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals 
affirmed and Thiokol's petition to this court 
followed 
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends 
that the court of appeals erred m affirming the 
dismissal of Thiokol's tort claims. In addition, 
Thiokol claims the court of appeals erred in 
holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert 
that the modified tanks should have complied 
with the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol claims 
that each of these issues presents only questions 
of law which this court should review 
nondeferentially. See State v. Pena, 869 P 2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's 
tort claims. In its post-tnal memorandum 
decision, the trial court refused to address 
Thiokol's negligence and strict liability claims 
because it concluded that the case was "entirely 
controlled by contract.'* The court of appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that because uthe contract 
expressly provided that [Interwest and Palmer] 
were under a duty to design, construct, and 
deliver a product free from defects and suitable 
for the purposes for which it was to be used," 
their uresponsibility in tort is . . . exactly 
co-extensive with their contractual obligations," 
thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest 
Constr , 886 P 2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that 
the court of appeals misconstrued our earlier 
decision in Beck as establishing the proposition 
that uif parties arrange rights, duties, and 
obligations under a contract, any cause of action 
for breach of those contractually defined 
obligations, rights, or duties lies in contract, not 
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in tort " Id (citing Beck, 701 P 2d at 799-800). 
Although we ultimately reach the result thai 
Thiokol's tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokoi 
that the court of appeals misapplied our holding 
in Beck, In Beck, we addressed whether an 
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing allowed its insured to sue the 
insurer in tort We held that uin a first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its insured, 
the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary.'' Beck, 701 
P.2d at 800 Because we found no independent 
fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance 
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay 
claims, we further held, "Without more, a 
breach of [contractual! implied or express duties 
can give rise only to a cause of action in 
contract, not one in tort " Id. 
Nonetheless, we specifically noted m Beck that 
"in some cases the acts constituting a breach of 
contract may also result in breaches of duty that 
are mdependent of the contract and may give 
rise to causes of action m tort " Id at 800 n.3 
(givmg examples). However, m Beck, we 
refused, for a number of policy reasons, see id. 
at 798-801, to recognize a tort action in the 
context of a first-party insurance relationship. 
In the instant case, the court of appeals 
assumed on the basis of Beck that language in 
Thiokol's contract calling for a product "free 
from defects" supplanted any mdependent tort 
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver 
nondefective products or services. See Interwest 
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. But the limitation we 
adopted m Beck is not broadly applicable to all 
contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred 
to a specific relationship between contractmg 
parties. Each category of relationships must be 
analyzed to determine, as a matter of law and 
policy, whether m that setting a party to a 
contract owes any tort-type duties to the other 
beyond the duties spelled out in the contract. 
See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 
413, 417-20 (Utah 1986) (applying analytical 
model for determining whether tort duties exist); 
see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts §92, at 655 (5th ed. 
1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the 
nature of the defendant's activity, (u) the 
relationship between the parties, and (in) the 
type of injury or harm threatened to determine 
whether tort obligations are owed m addition to 
contract promises). 
Thiokoi cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), as an example of an 
instance where we recognized that a tort duty 
may exist even when the relationship between 
the parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR 
Inc., we allowed a clothmg store owner to 
pursue a tort claim against a company which 
agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm 
when the company knew but failed to warn the 
store owner that the alarm could be easily 
deactivated by criminals. Id. at 434. We 
recognized that under those factual 
circumstances, one who undertakes to provide 
services for another owes a tort duty to the other 
to perform such services with reasonable care. 
Id at 435-37, see Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§323 (1965).2 We explained that "'the 
defendant's tort liability is not based upon 
breach of contract, but rather upon violation of 
the legal duty independently imposed as a result 
of what the defendant undertook to do with 
relation to the plaintiffs interests.'" Id. at 437 
(quoting Carl S Hawkins, Retaining Traditional 
Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions, 
1981 B.Y.U. L Rev 33, 36). 
We agree that a buyer of products or services 
may, in some circumstances, assert tort claims 
along with breach of contract claims against a 
supplier That recognition is nothing more than 
an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have 
permitted certain actions~for example, products 
liability—to include claims sounding m both tort 
and contract See Keeton et al , supra, §92, at 
660-61 
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of 
Thiokol's suppliers are necessanly "exactly 
co-extensive with their contractual obligations," 
as the court of appeals held. Interwest Constr., 
886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokoi alleged that its 
suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent 
foreseeable harm to others (negligence) or 
manufactured and sold the tanks m a defective 
condition that made them unreasonably 
dangerous to others (strict liability). Our 
decision in Beck does not control whether these 
tort claims can coexist with Thiokol's contract 
claims. That determination requires a deeper 
analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal, 
that analysis is unnecessary. We will take a 
shorter route and simply assume, without 
decidmg, that some tort and contract claims can 
coexist m the instant case. 
In light of this assumption, we also hold that 
the ttfree from defects" contractual provision 
cited by the court of appeals is insufficient as a 
matter of law to exempt Thiokol's suppliers 
from strict tort or negbgence liability. On 
grounds of pubbc policy, parties to a contract 
may not generally exempt a seller of a product 
from strict tort habdity for physical harm to a 
user or consumer unless the exemption term "is 
fairly bargamed for and is consistent with the 
policy underlying that [strict tort] habdity." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §195(3) 
(1981). While parties to a contract may 
generally exempt themselves from negligence 
Lability, the language they use must "'clearly 
and unequivocally' express an mtent to limit tort 
habdity" in the contract itself. DCR Inc., 663 
P.2d at 438; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §195 cmt. b (1981). Without such an 
expression of mtent, "'the presumption is 
against any such intention, and it is not achieved 
by inference or implication from general 
language such as was employed here.'" DCR 
Inc., 663 P.2d at 437 (quotmg Union Pac. R.R. 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 
(Utah 1965)). 
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Accordmgly, we hardly see how a contractual 
promise to provide a product "free from 
defects" amounts to an exemption from tort 
liability, especially when we have refused to 
enforce very detailed and thorough exculpatory 
clauses that presented a much closer case for 
exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at 
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's 
strict liability and negligence claims were not 
precluded by the existence of a contract which 
contained a promise that Interwest and its 
subcontractors would supply products ufree from 
defects " We thus disapprove of the reasoning 
employed by the court of appeals to affirm the 
trial court's decision. 
We now address Thiokol's negligence and 
strict liability claims on the merits. uTo recover 
for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the 
defendant breached the duty, the breach was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and 
there was in fact injury." Jackson v. Righter, 
891 P2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995): see also 
Hunsaker v State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 
1993), Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d 111, 116 
(Utah 1991); Williams v Melb\, 699 P 2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1985) To recover on a strict liability 
theory agamst a seller engaged m selling 
products of the kind at issue, a plaintiff must 
prove (i) that the product v.as unreasonably 
dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, 
(n) that the defect existed at the time the product 
was sold, and (in) that the defective condition 
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Lamb v B&B 
Amusements Corp , 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 
1993); see also Mulhenn v Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W 
Hahn, Inc \. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 
158 (Utah 1979), Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§402A (1965); Keeton et al., supra, §103. 
Assuming, without deciding, that Thiokors 
suppliers owed it tort duties which they 
breached, it is nonetheless axiomatic that to 
successfully prosecute actions for negligence and 
strict liability, the complaining party must prove 
that another party's breach of duty proximately 
caused the first party's injury. See Jackson, 891 
P.2d at 1392 (negligence), Mulhenn, 628 P.2d 
at 1304 (strict liability), see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §281 (1965). Proof of 
proximate cause is also required in breach of 
warranty actions, which may sound in either 
contract or tort Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 
697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985); Mulhenn, 628 
P.2d at 1304, Hahn, 601 P.2d at 159. 
"Proximate cause is 4ttthat cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequencef] (unbroken by 
an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one 
that necessarily sets m operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alteration m 
original) (quoting Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46 
(quoting State v Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 
fl.3 (Utah 1984))), 
Applymg these principles to the instant case 
and assummg that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort 
duties which they breached, we hold that 
Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same reason 
that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to 
prove that any defect m the design or 
manufacture of tank T33 proximately caused the 
August 24th failure. The trial court specifically 
noted contrary testimony on causation: namely, 
that Fiberglass Structures failed to properly 
design, engineer, manufacture, or test the tanks 
and that these failures contributed to the failure 
of tank T33 However, the trial court ruled 
against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim 
because it found that Thiokol caused the August 
24th failure by overfilling tank T33. We read 
this as a factual determination that Thiokol's 
misuse of tank T33 exceeded the fault, if any, of 
its suppliers Otherwise, the trial court would 
have apportioned damages on Thiokol's breach 
of warranty claim See Interwest Constr., 886 
P 2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages 
on Thiokol's breach of warranty claim). 
Accordingly, this finding also defeats 
Thiokol's strict liability and negligence claims, 
because they are premised on the same conduct 
and resulted in the same alleged damages as the 
breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co. 
v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, Inc , 619 P 2d 306, 312 
(Utah 1980). We thus disapprove of the 
reasoning employed by the court of appeals to 
affirm the trial court's ruling but affirm the 
result reached by both courts. 
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court 
of appeals erred in holdmg that Thiokol waived 
its rights to enforce the terms of its original 
contract with Interwest with respect to the 
repaired tanks Thiokol insists that its original 
contract with Interwest incorporated the 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69, a national 
voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and 
fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the 
standard, and therefore the contract, called for 
a wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch and a 
safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified 
tanks had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor 
of 6 to 1 3 
We first note that the trial court concluded that 
the "NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not 
incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with 
sufficient clarity in the contract for the designer 
and manufacturer to be aware of their 
application: specifically with respect to wall 
thickness and safety factors." 
The court of appeals, in turn, initially 
affirmed the trial court's finding that there was 
no breach of contract because Thiokol's 
suppliers ubuilt and supplied the tanks m 
accordance with the terms of the contract." 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. The court of 
appeals then began its waiver analysis. The 
court first noted, without analysis, that the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall 
thickness dimensions and a safety factor of 10 to 
1 and that the tanks did not meet these alleged 
requirements Id at 97 & nn.6-7. Then the 
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court of appeals concluded that even if the 
contract incorporated the NBS standard, Thiokol 
had waived its right to msist that the tanks 
conform to the wall thickness and safety factor 
the standard allegedly required. Id at 98 The 
court reasoned that because Thiokol approved 
Fiberglass Structures' proposed design for 
remedying the defective tanks, supervised their 
reconstruction, "and accepted the tanks although 
aware that they were not constructed in 
accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol 
waived its right to claim that the modified tanks 
were deficient because they failed to meet the 
design or construction specifications allegedl> 
incorporated into the original contract. Id 
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals' 
waiver analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny 
because (1) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was a 
material term of the contract which cannot be 
waived, and (n) an intentional waiver did not 
occur because Thiokol never knew the tanks did 
not meet the NBS/PS 15 69 specifications until 
after the August 24th failure; and (in) b> 
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and 
replace the three tanks after the fust failure on 
April 30th, Thiokol was merely permitting that 
supplier to cure its deficient performance, and 
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate 
Thiokol's rights to demand full performance 
under the original contract. Thiokol notes that if 
left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver 
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by 
deterring contracting parties from attempting to 
cure defective contract performance. 
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol 
and assumed by the court of appeals that the 
contract incorporated minimum wall thickness 
dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue 
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. 
Thiokol concedes that the tnal court expressly 
found that the contract did not incorporate such 
requirements but claims that the court of appeals 
found that it did. Thiokol contends that the court 
of appeals could do so because whether the 
original contract incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard presents a question of law which an 
appellate court can correct without giving 
deference to the tnal court's findings and 
conclusions. 
However, both Thiokol and the court of 
appeals have misconstrued the issue m this case. 
We do not read the tnal court's finding as 
rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard mto the contract, but as a fmdmg that 
the standard did not mandate tank walls thicker 
than 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1 so as 
to make these required terms of the contract. 
Our reading is supported by the fact that the 
tnal court did consider whether tank T33 met 
NBS/PS 15-69's unambiguous requirement that 
"all layers shall be overlapped a minimum of 1 
inch" but found that Thiokol had not pro\en the 
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note 
3. 
As we set forth below, under our reading, the 
tnal court's fmdmg that the contract's reference 
to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate 
wall thickness or safety factor requirements is a 
factual fmdmg which Thiokol has not properly 
challenged. Thiokol has therefore failed to meet 
its burden on appeal to u 'marshal the evidence 
m support of the fmdmgs and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the tnal court's 
fmdmgs are so lacking m support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous."" Hall v. 
Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 
1024, 1028 (Utah 1995) (quoting A House & 
1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4) (additional 
citation omitted). uAbsent such a showing, we 
4assume[ | that the record supports the fmdmgs 
of the tnal court and proceed to a re\iew of the 
accurac} of the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in the case.'" Id. 
(alteration m onginal) (quoting/4 House & 1.37 
Acres, 886 P 2d at 538 n.4). 
We first clanfy the standard of review for 
interpretation of a contract. Determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous presents a 
threshold question of law, which we review for 
correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Pioneer Oil <k Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 
(Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v. 
Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a 
contract is unambiguous, a tnal court may 
interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we 
review the court's interpretation for correctness. 
Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of 
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at 
108 (quotmg Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is 
found to be ambiguous, a court may consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. Id. 
Determining the meaning of a contract by 
extrinsic evidence generally presents questions 
of fact for the tner of fact, whose fmdmgs we 
review deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at 
358; see also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah EHv. 
of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 
(Utah 1990); John D. Calaman & Joseph M. 
Penllo, Contracts §3-14 (3d ed. 1987). 
Applymg the foregoing rules, we first look to 
the four corners of the contract itself to 
determine whether it is ambiguous. We conclude 
that while the contract unambiguously referred 
to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term 
requiring the tanks to conform to the "applicable 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69" made the 
precise meaning of the performance mtended by 
the parties ambiguous. "Applicable" is defined 
as "(f]it, suitable, pertinent, related to, or 
appropnate; capable of being applied." Black's 
Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed. 1990). The word 
"applicable" necessanly implies that (l) all the 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69 apply; (u) some 
requirements apply while others do not; or (111) 
none of the requirements apply. We must 
therefore review the NBS standard to determine 
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whether any of its provisions unambiguously 
mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a 
safety factor of 10 to 1 
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals 
that the standard does not unambiguously 
mandate a particular wail thickness or safety 
factor for the tanks. The standard spans eighteen 
pages and covers materials, laminate properties, 
round and rectangular ducting, reinforced 
polyester piping, reinforced polyester tanks, 
inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so 
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6 
of the standard states, tt[M]inimum wall 
thickness shall be as specified in the tables 
, but m no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 mch 
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating 
conditions." Turning to table 7, which specifies 
minimum wall thicknesses for vertical 
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find 
that the table does not mclude dimensions for 
tanks greater than 12 feet in diameter, and tanks 
T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in 
diameter Table 7 also notes that its figures are 
u[biased on a safety factor of 10 to 1 and a 
liquid specific gravity of 1 2." The NBS 
standard does not mclude a formula for 
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different 
sizes than those included in table 7, for different 
safety factors, or for liquids with different 
specific gravities. 
Moreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS 
standard does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1 
safety factor is "the recognized industry" 
standard, contrary to the unsupported assertion 
of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886 
P.2d at 97 n.6, or that this safety factor is 
required in all fiberglass tanks. Other tables m 
the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and flanges 
are based on different safety factors, and we 
have found no formula or recommendation 
regarding selection of a mandatory safety factor. 
Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically 
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as 
merely stating the assumptions upon which its 
wall thickness specifications for standard-sized 
tanks rest. 
In short, the word "applicable" in the 
contract, coupled with the lack of specificity 
withm the NBS standard, renders the contract 
ambiguous with respect to the thickness of the 
tank walls and a specific safety factor without 
resort to extrinsic evidence The trial court 
apparently also found the contract provision 
ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration of 
extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's 
meaning. Whether the standard mandated a 
mmimum wall thickness and a safety factor of 
10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial. After 
hearing the evidence, the trial court found as a 
matter of fact that the contract, as drafted by 
Thiokol, did not impose the mmimum wall 
thickness and safety factor requirements that 
Thiokol claims were mandated by the NBS/PS 
15-69 standard. 
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual finding before 
the court of appeals, and so that court should 
have presumed that the trial court's fmdmg was 
correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate 
court does not "'set aside the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence or [the appellate court] otherwise 
reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.'" Sweeney Land Co. v. 
KimbalL 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Western Kane County Special Serv. 
Dist. No I v. Jackson Cattle Co , 744 P.2d 
1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). "This standard of 
review applies equally to the Court of Appeals." 
Id.; see also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals court 
should have deferred to the trial court's factual 
finding regarding the meaning of the contract m 
light of its facial ambiguity and should have 
presumed the correctness of the fmdmg, given 
Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on 
appeal. 
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' 
waiver analysis was irrelevant and superfluous 
because it proceeded from an incorrect factual 
assumption. In contrast to the court of appeals, 
the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard did not mandate a minimum wall 
thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a safety factor 
of 10 to 1. A contracting party cannot be said to 
waive a term that was never part of the contract. 
Because the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not 
mandate a particular wall thickness or safety 
factor, Thiokol could not waive these "terms." 
However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol 
cannot now claim that its suppliers failed to 
adhere to these "terms" and therefore breached 
their contracts. 
Accordmgly, we are left with the trial court's 
factual fmdmg that "the tanks were built 
pursuant to the design specifications mandated 
by Thiokol m the contract," and the court of 
appeals' affirmance, based on that fmdmg, of 
the trial court's conclusion that there was no 
breach of contract. Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d 
at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of that portion 
of the court of appeals opinion which held that 
Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of 
its original contract with Interwest but affirm 
that court's conclusion that there was no breach 
of contract. 
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with 
Interwest did not preclude Thiokol's claims for 
negligence and strict liability but that those 
claims fail as a matter of law because Thiokol 
caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We 
also hold that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's 
breach of contract claim, because the contract 
provision the court of appeals found Thiokol to 
have waived did not mandate a minimum wall 
thickness greater than 1/4 mch or a 10 to 1 
safety factor as Thiokol claims. However, we 
affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that 
Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract. 
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge 
Hardmg concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's 
opmion. 
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Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the 
result 
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon 
does not participate herein; District Judge Ray 
M Harding sat. 
1. These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court 
of Appeals' opinion in this case For a more complete 
recitation of the facts see Interwest Construction v 
Palmer, 886 P 2d 92, 94-95 (Ct App 1994), cert 
granted sub nom Fiberglass v Thiokol, 892 P 2d 13 
(Utah 1995) 
2. Section 323 of the Restatement provides 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of the other's person or things, is 
subject to liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 
reliance upon the undertaking 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965) We also 
note that manufacturers and suppliers of products may 
be subject to other tort duties even though their 
products are sold via contract See id §§388-90 
(pertaining to suppliers), id §§395-98 (pertaining to 
manufacturers), id §402A (pertaining to strict liability 
for defective products) 
3. Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the 
tanks' structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch 
rather than the one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69 
calls for and that the tensile strength of the tanks was 
insufficient However, the trial court specifically 
rejected this version of the facts, finding that Thiokol 
presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of 
these points Thiokol failed to challenge the trial 
court's factual findings before the court of appeals 
Interwest Constr , 886 P 2d at 96 ("Thiokol does not 
challenge the trial court's factual findings ") We 
therefore refuse to address them in this opinion 
Butterfield v Okubo, 831 P 2d 97, 101 n 2 (Utah 
1992) To the extent that the court of appeals recited 
the trial court's findings incorrectly, see Interwest 
Constr , 886 P 2d at 97 n 7, we vacate that portion of 
its opinion 
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